At a pivotal moment for the Middle East, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune convened senior policymakers, strategists, and thought leaders for a private breakfast briefing marking the publication of its seventeenth issue.
The gathering featured distinguished guest speaker Eliot A. Cohen — strategist, author, former Counselor at the U.S. State Department, and Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies — whose work has long shaped serious thinking on war, statecraft, and American strategy.
Held under Chatham House Rules, the discussion itself remains confidential.
But the strategic questions that brought participants together could not be more urgent.
How should we think about the day after conflict?
What might Iran’s transition mean for the region?
And can this historic moment help shape a genuinely new Middle East?
These questions are no longer theoretical. They are shaping the future now.
The Day After: Iran’s Transition and the Architecture of a New Middle East
by
April 2026
Recent Articles
The Energy Transition’s Inconvenient Paradox
Climate finance is growing — but it won’t solve energy poverty unless we finance the diverse energy portfolios that developing economies actually need. When nearly 200 countries adopted the Belém Political Package at COP 30 last November, they pledged $1.3 trillion per year in climate finance and tripled the adaptation target—then failed to agree on any roadmap […]
How America Should Wage War Against Iran
America’s current war against Iran is not simply or merely a military contest.The outcome will reflect more than comparative military forces and strategies. No matter how often Donald Trump may warn that “an entire civilization could die tonight,” Tehran will remain focused on its long-term goals. In the words of chief Iranian negotiator Mohammad Baqer […]
The Geopolitical Opportunity of the Century for the U.S. and European Union
Today, for the first time in a century, the Donald Trump administration possesses a tangible opportunity not merely to minimize the Russian threat, influence, or competition, but to oversee a completely managed disintegration of Russia. This would strip Moscow of its aggressive agency and global prospects, if not permanently, then for a very long time […]
