Regime Change in Tehran Is a Strategic Imperative

by February 2026

The debate over Iran has long revolved around tactics: sanctions or engagement, containment or deterrence, military strikes or diplomatic agreements. These discussions, while important, obscure a more fundamental reality. The challenge posed by Iran is not merely about enrichment levels, missile ranges, or proxy networks. It is about the nature of the regime itself.

The Islamic Republic is not simply a difficult negotiating partner. It is a revolutionary regime whose identity is inseparable from confrontation — externally against Israel, the United States, and regional governments; internally against its own citizens.

So long as this regime endures in its current ideological form, instability will remain structural to the Middle East.

The Root of the Regional Crisis

For decades, Tehran has invested enormous national resources in exporting its revolution. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen are not isolated actors. They are instruments of a deliberate strategy designed to reshape the regional order through sustained armed pressure and ideological subversion.

This strategy has imposed staggering costs on the region — weakened states, prolonged civil wars, economic devastation, and chronic insecurity. It has also imposed enormous costs on the Iranian people, whose economic future has been sacrificed to sustain missile production and foreign militias.

The connection between repression at home and aggression abroad is direct. A regime that lacks domestic legitimacy seeks strategic relevance externally.

And the scale of repression cannot be understated. In successive waves of nationwide protests, the regime has not merely arrested or intimidated dissenters. It has used systematic lethal force, resulting in the killing of thousands of Iranians over the years — citizens whose primary demand was dignity, economic opportunity, and basic freedoms. The regime’s willingness to massacre its own population to preserve clerical rule reveals the depth of its moral and political bankruptcy.

The Limits of Containment

Over the past decade, much of the international community has attempted to manage Iran’s behavior rather than confront its governing logic. Nuclear agreements aimed to delay weaponization. Sanctions sought to impose economic discipline. Diplomatic engagement hoped to moderate conduct. None addressed the regime’s ideological core.

Even if Iran were to temporarily cap enrichment or adjust missile activity, the structural drivers of instability would remain intact. A regime whose political theology defines America as an adversary and Israel as illegitimate cannot be permanently stabilized through technical arrangements. Containment may postpone crisis. It does not resolve it.

Why Now: A Strategic Window

The argument for political transformation in Tehran is not new. What is new is the convergence of circumstances.

First, the regime is internally weaker than it has been in decades. Economic deterioration, corruption, demographic pressure, and widening societal alienation have eroded its domestic foundations. The leadership maintains control through coercion, not consent.

Second, the regional balance has shifted. Iran’s proxy architecture has been degraded. Its aura of strategic inevitability has been punctured. Deterrence has been reestablished against its most aggressive instruments.

Third, the United States has assembled a significant military posture in the region. Strategic assets have been positioned, capabilities are visible, and the credibility of deterrence has been reinforced. Whether or not force is ultimately used, the presence of such capability alters the strategic calculus in Tehran.

Finally, the justification is clear. The regime’s nuclear ambitions, missile expansion, regional subversion, and mass repression provide ample legal, moral, and strategic grounds for decisive policy.

Moments in history when weakness, deterrence, and legitimacy align are rare. This is such a moment.

The Cost of Strategic Hesitation

Opportunities, if missed, carry consequences.

If the current window closes without structural change in Tehran, the regime will regroup. It will rebuild proxy networks. It will accelerate nuclear advancement. It will interpret hesitation as validation.

A restored and emboldened regime would pose a far greater threat than the one facing pressure today. The cycle of containment, escalation, temporary pause, and renewed confrontation would resume — at higher levels of risk. Strategic patience must not become strategic paralysis.

Regime Change as Strategic Logic

The phrase “regime change” is often treated as reckless. It should be understood instead as strategic realism. A Middle East in which Iran is governed by a leadership that prioritizes economic development, normal state relations, and domestic welfare would look fundamentally different from a Middle East shaped by revolutionary guardianship and proxy warfare.

Political transformation in Iran ultimately depends on the Iranian people. External actors cannot impose legitimacy. But they can deny the regime resources, strategic victories, and nuclear insurance. They can maintain credible military deterrence. And they can make clear that permanent confrontation will not ensure indefinite survival.

The current Iranian model has demonstrated consistency: repression at home, aggression abroad, nuclear ambition as insurance, and proxy warfare as leverage. Stability cannot be built on that foundation.

Strategic Clarity

Preventing nuclear breakout is essential. Deterring missile proliferation is necessary. Degrading proxy networks is vital. But these measures address symptoms. The disease is the regime’s governing doctrine.

Political transformation in Tehran is not a peripheral aspiration. It is central to any durable regional order.

History rarely offers moments when vulnerability, deterrence, and justification converge. This is such a moment.

Failure to recognize it — or to act accordingly — would not preserve stability. It would postpone confrontation at a higher cost.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser
Head of Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. Former Head of the Research Division, IDF Military Intelligence