On June 9, the Government of Israel decided on an extensive military operation, begun at three in the morning on Friday June 13, against Iran’s nuclear facilities, military leadership and ballistic missile infrastructure. Leading to this decision were a threat perception, which has been growing for decades, a window of opportunity, which opened in autumn 2024, and the immediate trigger – the apparent failure, acknowledged by the Trump administration, of the diplomatic track.
Politically and personally, Netanyahu (who had been keen to strike already in 2010-2012, only to be held back by the defense establishment) clearly seeks to make this, rather than the disaster of October 7, 2023, the defining moment of his life and legacy. He was able to prevail this time, despite serious doubts raised in internal discussions, because the threat has become more acute than ever – and because Iran’s deterrent posture was greatly reduced. The full and final outcome of Israel’s decision is far from clear. But it is safe to assert that it has ushered in a new chapter in regional history.
The Trigger: Iran’s Insistence on Continued Enrichment
There were two immediate reasons for Israel’s decision to act on June 13. The first was the apparent deadlock in the talks between the American and Iranian negotiators; and the other was the growing Israeli impression that the Trump administration – despite its threatening posture, including the bomber deployment to Diego Garcia – was not likely to opt for military action, even if the talks were apparently heading towards failure.
The American negotiating position, even if stated at times in ambiguous or nuanced terms, was that Iran must give up not only its nuclear weaponization efforts but also its uranium enrichment at all levels. Tehran, on the other hand, refused to accept full dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure (specifically, the enrichment facilities). This is what Libya’s Mu’ammar Qaddafi had agreed to do and his ultimate fate – US-led intervention, defeat and death – perhaps weighed heavily on the Iranians’ mind, and led them to interpret this American demand as a precursor to further pressure and ultimately regime change. Rather than offer further concessions, their position hardened.
Five rounds of talks did not close the gap on the crucial issue of enrichment and the sixth was cancelled, as Iran withdrew from the talks. Thus, with Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235 – a short step away from weapon-grade – growing dangerously week by week, Israel came to see the situation in terms of “it’s now or never.”
What nevertheless seemed to stay Israel’s hand, at least for a while, was not the overt American warnings not to act, but rather the hope that the US military itself might take action, with its superior capabilities including the 2,300 kilogram smart bomb, the “Massive Ordnance Penetrator.” As wide differences of opinion emerged in the ranks of the Trump administration as to the use of force, the inner circle of Israeli decision makers apparently concluded that it would be too high a risk to let the country’s defense be subject to this level of uncertainty.
Were the openly stated differences of opinion between the Americans and Israelis an elaborate scheme to lull the Iranians into complacency? While some observers are inclined (given Trump’s post-facto support for Israel’s action) to suggest that this was the case, they may well be guilty of the familiar fallacy of over-explanation.
Trump’s preference for a negotiated outcome was – and is – genuine. He did, however, use the prospect of Israeli action to push the Iranians towards a deal, and now he is again trying to leverage Israel’s actual action in order to get Iran back to the table on his terms. But for Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, such a submission to America’s will – from a position of weakness – may still be akin to an admission that the Islamic Revolution has come to the point of failure. The American offer to return to the table will not be met at this stage.
The Long-Term Factor: Iranian Regime as Existential Threat
This sense that Israel’s very existence depends on taking action against an Iranian regime with an exterminatory agenda is rooted in decades of growing threat perception. It is particularly true for Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has been at the forefront of this issue for decades, and now sees it as an opportunity to redeem his record from the failures of preparedness on October 7, 2023.
The elimination of Israel is central to the identity and purpose of the Islamic (or rather, Islamist) Republic. For the revolutionary regime which took power in 1979, the pursuit of Israel’s demise serves as important proof that Iran, a revolutionary Shi’ite power, can do (and does) much more than the Sunni “weaklings and traitors” elsewhere in the region, who made their peace with the Jewish state.
This central idea and vision, moreover, has been systematically translated over the years into an active program of support for proxies and partners willing to act against Israel. Primary among these has been Hizbullah in Lebanon, for years a major threat on Israel’s northern front. When Palestinian Islamic Jihad (a fully controlled proxy) and Hamas (a more independent ally) took power in Gaza in 2007 they increasingly relied on Iranian support. They also seek to overthrow the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and would like to undermine and destabilize the Jordanian monarchy. Iranian-backed Shi’a militias in Iraq, and more significantly, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, have all played a role in a “ring of fire” around Israel, joining the action initiated by Hamas in October 2023. Finally, in April and October 2024, Iran took direct action of its own, launching massive missile and drone attacks against Israel (albeit with very limited results).
The Iranians’ false claim that this is a civilian project (and that there is a “fatwa” or religious injunction against nuclear weapons) was never taken seriously. There are no civilian uses for uranium enriched to 60 percent: it can only be a final stepping-stone to weapons-grade enrichment. In any case, by 2018 Israel came to possess the Iranian nuclear archive, confirming previous evidence of work on weaponization, even if it was suspended for a while back in 2003. More recently, fresh intelligence sources indicated that the work of the weapons group has aggressively resumed.
In addition, Israel concluded that Iran was massively increasing its ballistic missile arsenal. This was in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, but once its provisions expired on October 18, 2023 – while Israel’s attention was obviously elsewhere – Iran embarked on a much expanded program. Netanyahu claims this program would have produced some 300 missiles a month, generating the prospect of massive destructive power even without a bomb. This, too, drove the decision to act: but it was only in November 2024 that this took the form of a planning directive.
The Window of Opportunity
Iran’s nuclear (and missile) projects have been a permanent presence on the minds of Israeli decision makers for decades. They have also preyed on the thoughts of people on the street. Yet the decision to take all-out action – as distinct from what Prime Minister Naftali Bennet once called “a thousand pinpricks” of sabotage and assassinations – was put off again and again.
There was an active internal debate between 2010 and 2012 on taking military action. Netanyahu’s push for it was blocked by the security professionals’ reservations (and American objections). There were questions at the time as to Israel’s capabilities, as well as what seemed then – and later – to be the formidable retaliatory arsenal of Iran and its proxies. All this curbed the enthusiasm of the intelligence community and defense establishment.
After the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there came a period in which Iranian enrichment was slowed down, and the likelihood of a “dash” to the bomb was put off by a few years. This gave Israel vital breathing space, but the time gained was not used to enhance the preparations for action against Iran, and resources were directed to other missions. This remained the case even after President Trump, back in 2018, nixed the American commitment to the JCPOA. It was only later that Israel’s leaders, from both sides of the partisan divide, woke up to the reality of the newly accelerated Iranian project.
What changed the Israeli cost-benefit analysis were two dramatic changes in the final months of 2024: the death of Hasan Nasrallah and the sharp reduction in Hizbullah’s ability and will to attack Israel; and the collapse of the Asad regime, enabling Israel to destroy residual Syrian capabilities and then act freely through Syrian airspace. In addition, the Iranian missile barrages in April and October 2024 did limited damage. And Israel’s counterstrikes exposed the weakness of Iran’s air defenses.
The aggregate impact of these changes made it possible for Netanyahu to designate April 2025 as the point in time for the attack: but owing to President Trump’s push for a negotiated outcome (and the concurrent hints at possible American military action) it was postponed by several weeks.
Meanwhile, the rationale for it did gain international grounding: the announcement by Rafael Mariano Grossi, the Argentinian diplomat serving as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It lent legitimacy to Israel’s sense of urgency but did not produce it. Moreover, the common assumption that the Iranian people would “rally around the flag” if the country would come under attack may no longer be valid, given the growing disenchantment with the mullahs’ regime.
Where will this lead? As Israel’s National Security Adviser Tzahi Hanegbi openly said on June 13, Israel’s military achievements, and America’s determination that Iran must not have a nuclear capability, should be translated into an enduring diplomatic arrangement, which would also serve regional security writ large. More still needs to happen before the conditions for such an outcome mature.
