In late November, Secretary of the Navy John Phelan canceled the increasingly challenged Constellation-class frigate program. The Constellation was to be built as a modified version of the European multipurpose frigate, designed by Naval Group (a French company) and Fincantieri (an Italian company with shipyards in Wisconsin). Only two of the planned six frigates, already under construction, will now be built. This is part of the Defense Department’s newly released acquisition strategy.
Bravo Zulu, Mr. Secretary, you are moving in the right direction. But there are lessons learned from cancellation of the Constellation program.
Lesson 1: Do Not Start Before the Design is Fully Defined
A lack of consensus on the frigate’s desired capabilities doomed the Constellation program. The intended use of the European parent-design approach was thought to reduce design time, design cost, production cost, and the overall technical risk involved in building the ship. Its design underwent standard modifications to meet US Navy requirements.
By early 2025, commonality between the Constellation-class frigate and the purchased European frigate design had dropped from 85 percent to just 15 percent. After nearly 40 months of delays, the staggering degree of design modification cost the Navy over $400 million dollars and time that it did not have to spare.
Among other design hold-ups, the frigates were to be equipped with enough vertical launch system missile tubes to offset the reduction in tubes across the Navy’s surface fleet as Ticonderoga-class cruisers are gradually retired. Debates over the number of missile tubes, potential costs incurred, and capacity needed are emblematic of the lack of consensus on what precisely the Constellation-class was intended to deliver.
Lesson 2: Set Steady Demand Signals & Provide Consistent Funding
Prior to the start of the second Trump administration, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee questioned Navy leadership about the number of shipyards needed to build the Constellation-class frigate in the timeframe planned. Then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, confirmed that plans were under consideration to expand to two shipyards for the program. But expanding production to two shipyards was unlikely to ever be feasible.
The US defense industrial base faces a labor shortage crisis. In 2024, workforce shortfalls were cited as a leading cause of frigate production delays. Fincantieri’s existing yard in Marinette, Wisconsin, like all other yards nationally, struggles to maintain an equipped and well-trained workforce capable of delivering programs at cost and on schedule.
Fincantieri Marinette Marine lacked the consistent year-over-year funding needed to sustain and expand its workforce and meet delivery timelines, while managing a steady supply chain. Yards, such as the one in Marinette, need attention and appropriations to jump start a ramp-up in production. Furthermore, the Navy should aim to provide its industry partners a steady demand signal that allows for more predictable production planning.
Lesson 3: Next Time, Do It with Allies
In Secretary Phelan’s efforts to “grow the fleet faster to meet tomorrow’s threats,” he should not dismiss the critical advantages provided by closer cooperation with America’s allies, who can help the US Navy achieve its requirement of 73 small surface combatants.
Domestic builders face labor shortages and are not on track to meet demand on time or on budget. Turning to allied production sources is the Navy’s best shot at rebuilding the fleet it needs for existing and foreseeable operations. In particular, Japanese and South Korean industry have shown willingness to invest and have capacity within their own production facilities.
In March 2025, Air Force General Randall Reed, Commander of US Transportation Command, endorsed the Navy’s strategy of recapitalizing the US fleet with foreign-built sealift ships from the commercial used market. Such strategies should be extended to the Department of Navy in terms of its rapid procurement and acquisition strategy for surface vessels.
In order to meet Congressional mandates and counter a growing Chinese fleet, the Navy must regard the failure of the Constellation-class frigate as a cautionary tale. In future shipbuilding programs, the Navy should consider the types of capabilities that are most essential and agree on them, given existing industrial base constraints, and leverage allies’ capacities in pursuit of delivering a lethal fighting fleet.
