BACKGROUND
The second Trump administration will face immediate foreign policy dilemmas in all three Eurasian fronts. This paper concentrates on the Middle East, but the competing demands of Europe and East Asia, and the links among all of them, influence decisions everywhere. The dramatic events of the past year open the door to a regional breakthrough on the order of the post-Yom Kippur war of 1973 and post-Kuwait war of 1991.
Predicting any administration’s foreign policy priorities beyond the most basic (keep America strong and safe) is a challenge. To be sure, analysts can draw on the first Trump administration for guidance. But even in consecutive eight-year administrations the second term foreign policy agenda is often different (e.g., Obama, Bush). With Trump, term two will see a totally new foreign policy team, and a president with a powerful popular mandate and an even deeper disregard for foreign policy conventions than in the first term.
Most importantly, the world has changed dramatically in the past eight years. First, despite many Americans’ despondency with the state of the nation, the US has emerged from fifteen years of domestic, international, financial and epidemic crises in a more powerful position than its competitors and partners. Second, the new administration faces roaring wars in two of the three fronts, and a possible conflagration (Taiwan, North Korea) in the third. Finally, the “axis of resistance” globally has shifted under the pressure of the Ukraine war.
In 2017, China, as the “pacing military threat” and economic rival of the US, shaped policy thinking. While China remains the strongest rival, its relative strength versus the US, apart from some military capabilities, has diminished. The pacing “geostrategic challenge” now is Russia, dragging North Korea, Iran, and (less successfully) China along in an ever-tighter alliance as a consequence of its war in Ukraine. Given the limited impact China or Russia now have on Middle East security, they are not currently central to Middle East policy-making but need to be considered.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
President Trump will inherit three conflicts, Israel-Hamas, Israel-Hizbullah, and Israel-Iran, at some level of ferocity or relative calm depending on developments in the next weeks. He will have to recognize that Iran is the force behind all three conflicts, that Israel supported by the US has landed major blows to the entire Iranian network, and that the US must quickly drive decisions, or events will drive the administration in directions no one wants. Specifically:
Develop a Strategy. It is tempting to come out swinging on individual crises but, to avoid flailing, the administration needs a regional strategy. The Biden version has not been adequate. Such a strategy must first answer the question: what national interests does the US want to advance? That’s the easy part, as they have changed little over decades: preserve stability, ensure flow of hydrocarbons, facilitate navigation, advance alliance relationships, deter terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and stem destabilizing population displacements. The next step is to understand the primary threat to these interests: Iran over the past twenty years, steadily gaining ground until October 7. What’s harder is implementation. This paper does not prescribe specifics, only likely directions. The key element is a comprehensive approach to Iran, including its weapons programs and asymmetric warfare, and its satraps in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, building on the weakened position in which they now all find themselves.
Bring the Gaza and Lebanon Campaigns to a Successful Finish. If not accomplished by the outgoing administration, this will be the immediate operational priority. Israel has achieved most of its military objectives, and continuing military efforts likely represent diminishing returns on expensive investments, of casualties, money, and diplomatic attrition. Increasingly, the key to lasting victory now is in the “day after” diplomatic arrangements to build on military success. Arrangements that have worked include those following the Yom Kippur, Kuwait and Bosnia wars. Those that failed include Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon after initial American or Israel military victories. Successful arrangements must ensure, as UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006 famously did not, that foes (in this case Hamas and Hizbullah) do not reconstitute. That means oversight of their activities, permanent cut-off of resupply, and authority and willingness to intervene if reconstitution begins. Political and reconstruction initiatives have to reinforce security provisions and encourage shifts in populations’ support for terrorism. Finally, the enemy in each case must accept it has been defeated, agree to proposed diplomatic arrangements, and in the case of Hamas return the hostages.
Start Thinking About Israel-Palestinian Relations. Pushing Israel and the Palestinian Authority for a breakthrough under present conditions would be counterproductive. But the administration needs to think about options, and reach out to both Israelis and Palestinians, as eventual progress on these relations is critical for strategic success.
LONGER-TERM PROGRAM
Once the administration has gained its “sea legs,” and helped calm the current conflicts, it can focus on long-term strategy. Likely major elements given enduring interests, past administrations’ experience, and statements by President Trump, might include:
Strengthen the “By, With, and Through” approach with Israel, Arab states, and Turkey (to the extent its mercurial leader plays a positive regional role). Partners are crucial to augment American capabilities and reduce the burden on critical military and diplomatic assets. Arab states, despite recent “hedging” towards Tehran, share a common interest in containing Iran, and building on the Abraham Accords, particularly Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, is the most important step. But this requires Israeli restraint in the West Bank and an outline of a generally acceptable solution to the Palestinian issue. Likewise, the US and Israel must take tough decisions on Saudi Arabia’s security, weapons, and civil nuclear demands. American credibility in restraining Iran, recently demonstrated but previously questioned, is central to alliance integrity.
Contest Iran Throughout the Region. Apart from 2018-20, over the past twenty years Washington never effectively pursued this critical element of Iran containment. Detailed approaches will vary by country and situation, but the general, brutal rule of thumb should be, whatever Iran and proxies seek, the US and partners oppose. Syria is the main success here in freezing Iran’s advance, initiated by Trump, and maintained through the Biden administration. Washington should continue its minimal troop presence there and coordinate with Israel, Turkey, Syrian opposition forces, and Arab states to keep Assad neutral. The Houthis, if their attacks continue, must be hit harder. Only an unimaginable ground invasion guarantees their demise, but a more robust American response – even if it does not deter them – will show a resolve that is now questioned. Iraq and Lebanon are more complex. Washington’s longstanding policy of supporting reflexively the official governments and non-proxy elements in these countries, on the assumption they are able and willing to counter Tehran’s creeping state capture, has not worked. A tough love approach along the lines Secretary of State Pompeo used with Iraq – threatening to withdraw support and inflict pain, absent more spine against Iran – should be implemented.
On Iran’s Nukes, Emphasize Force, De-emphasize Diplomatic Wrangling. October 7 and Iran’s 2024 missile attacks demonstrate dramatically that keeping Iran from a nuclear weapon justifies use of force by both the US and Israel. Maintaining credibility that those states will so act is thus the primary restraint on Iran. Nuclear discussions with Teheran can be conducted, but only with two understandings. First, they have never kept Iran more than a year from nuclear breakout, and second, Iran has deliberately doled out minor concessions on its program to counter responses to its pernicious regional actions.
Talk with the Iranians. Washington-Tehran contacts, assuming partners are informed, have real if limited advantages. They can avoid or resolve serious incidents and advance deconfliction, similar to negotiations with the USSR. But such talks usually are not with the real decision-makers (the apparatus around the Supreme Leader and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps), will not “flip” Iran’s revolutionary mindset, and do not substitute for rigorous containment.
Avoid Distraction from other Middle East Issues. Regional stability rests on more than containing Iran, even though it’s the first priority. Russia and China while currently not major regional players can make trouble. But for now both are playing defense. Despite their ties with Tehran, they prioritize, in Russia’s case, its foothold in Syria, and in China’s, flow of oil and other trade. The US can exploit these interests to further tie Iran down. ISIS and other Sunni terrorist elements need to stay defeated, but that should increasingly be the mission of regional states and the Europeans. American efforts to eradicate social, political, and religious root causes of instability undoubtedly will continue, but given their sorry track record, they are no substitute for the hard work of containing security threats.
