Four decades in the undeclared conflict between Israel and Iran, the storm of war looms even larger over the Middle East, threatening to engulf its citizens in an unprecedented turmoil.
If the confrontation between Israel and Iran escalates, the mediator most trusted by both sides may not hail from Beijing, Moscow, or Washington, but from New Delhi.
China demonstrated an ability to engage in Middle East mediation when it helped ease tensions between Riyadh and Tehran in 2023. China’s relationship as a major buyer of oil from each country bolstered this mediation. India’s approach to Israel and Iran, however, stands on a different footing.
Historically, India has good relations with Iran, free of significant issues. Before 1947, India even shared a border with Iran, and it continues to have robust trade ties, particularly in the energy and infrastructure sectors. Indian entities are actively vying for tenders in pivotal projects in Iran, such as the 10-year contract to operate the Chabahar port, while Indian traders purchase cheap oil from Iranian sources.
India has also strengthened relations with Israel in recent years. Recently, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz spoke with his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar, and warned of Iran’s purported efforts to build a coalition in the Indian Ocean region, using Sudan as a platform, that could harm India’s shipping. Katz advocated for recognizing the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization and for imposing sanctions on Iran’s missile program. He urged India to align with the US-led coalition to thwart Iranian aggression. While perhaps such statements should have remained in private discussions, Katz’s public concerns reflect a noticeable shift in India’s approach to the current situation in the region since early October.
Despite Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strong condemnation of the October 7th massacres in Israel, the administration in New Delhi has reverted to a more balanced, traditional approach to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. India also noticeably warmed its ties with Iran, with increased visits by Indian officials to Tehran and the administration’s public statements. By the end of November, Delhi dispatched First Secretary Vinay Kwatra to Tehran to reaffirm India’s solidarity. In January, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar embarked on a two-day visit, meeting Foreign Minister Hussain Amir Abdullahian, to advocate for de-escalation and restraint.
Today, Delhi embodies a neutrality that has evolved through various phases, from a policy based on “strategic autonomy” to that of a “universal friend” (“Vishva Mitra” in Sanskrit). This stance, distinct from Swiss-style neutrality, aims at maintaining multiple opportunities to derive economic and strategic benefits for India while mediating between East and West, between developed countries and the Global South.
As tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, India could potentially serve as a bridge in that conflict. New Delhi stands to gain substantially. It could leverage a mediating role in the Middle East to bolster its demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
