In the early hours of March 18, the Israel Defense Forces began a round of airstrikes in Gaza targeting Hamas, the largest since a ceasefire that began on January 19 and ended on March 1.
The six-week ceasefire enabled the release of 33 Israeli hostages. Israel sought to extend it in exchange for the release of more hostages. Hamas wanted to negotiate the details of an agreed outline for a second phase of the ceasefire deal, which included IDF withdrawal from Gaza’s southern border with Egypt (and weapons smuggling route). US envoy Steve Witkoff proposed ceasefire extension terms that Hamas rejected.
Hamas assumed it could keep the ceasefire and the 59 hostages. But Israel called Hamas’ bluff. On March 18, Prime Minister Netanyahu issued a statement that “Israel will, from now on, act against Hamas with increasing military strength.”
This is the first major test of the new IDF chief of staff, General Eyal Zamir, who took command on March 5. His predecessor, General Herzi Halevi, resigned 17 months after the debacle of the October 7, 2023, the worst disaster in Israel’s history – worse than the 1973 war because it involved leaving Israeli civilians at the mercy of the enemy. For instance, Kibbutz Nir Oz was overrun for six hours on October 7. The IDF never arrived until after Hamas had left the place. Hamas murdered 46 Israelis and took 71 people hostage from Nir Oz.
The shadow of October 7 still hangs over the IDF. More investigations are coming out regarding the battles of many communities along the Gaza border that day. Zamir must handle the new operation while also restoring confidence in the IDF, at a time when Hamas still holds both Israeli civilians and soldiers.
The first fifteen months of fighting, from October 7, 2023 to January 19, 2024, took place in phases. The IDF initially responded with airstrikes and then a ground operation on October 27, 2023. That ground operation unleashed two divisions, the 36th and 162nd, to surround Gaza City and northern Gaza. Subsequent operations sought to squeeze Hamas in northern Gaza and defeat a dozen of its battalions. After a brief ceasefire in late November, the IDF shifted focus to the city of Khan Younis and other parts of southern Gaza. By March 2024, the IDF believed around twenty of the Hamas battalions had been “dismantled.”
A year later, the IDF continues to face Hamas in Gaza. The group has recruited. It has returned to control most of Gaza, except for the southern border area and other areas close to the Israeli border. Hamas choreographed the hostage releases in January and February to showcase its power. It also let Palestinian Islamic Jihad take part, showcasing the cooperation between the two groups.
Hamas appears to have few rockets but thousands of fighters left. They usually abstain from fighting and prefer to hide and wait, in the apparent belief that Israel will grow tired and get distracted. The IDF’s initial forays into Gaza tended to turn out that way. For instance, an IDF division would go into Khan Younis, dismantle Hamas tunnels and then leave after a few months. The same thing happened in northern Gaza between October and December 2024.
The question now is how to do this differently. In May 2024, Halevi called the IDF’s tactics a “Sisyphean” task. This basically meant the IDF could keep going into areas and leaving, but there was no lasting result.
Can the IDF find a strategy in Gaza and can Zamir deliver? The early phases of the campaign in Gaza appear to target Hamas political and civil leaders as well as military sites. It turns out that during the first 15 months of war many of the Hamas civil aspects in Gaza, such as police and Hamas politicians remained untouched. Hamas continued to distribute aid and was able to finance its war effort. It controlled all the civilians and could move among them. It appears the IDF may be considering shifting this policy, going after Hamas governance and increasing the pressure in phases.
Hamas could agree to a new ceasefire. However, Israel doesn’t appear to be in a mood to accept endless foot dragging by Hamas. Zamir will be called upon to act with “increasing military strength,” the Prime Minister’s office says.
Zamir will have the same units that fought in Gaza during the first year of the war. These include the 98th Division with the paratroops and commandos, the 36th with its Golani infantry and armored brigades, and the 162nd with Givati and Nahal infantry and the 401st armored brigades. In addition, the 252nd Division, which operated in the Netzarim corridor south of Gaza city during 2024, is ready to retake the corridor.
The units are the same. The terrain is the same. The enemy is the same. Zamir and the commanders he chooses will have to see if they can pull victory out of a long war. The challenge awaits.
