Israel’s defense and security establishment has completed a series of internal investigations into the intelligence, strategic, and tactical failures of October 7, 2023. The findings are beginning to reshape the Israel Defense Force (IDF) approach to dealing with the terrorist armies on its borders. Among the findings: the concept of deterrence (originating in Cold War interstate realism theory) and the practice of holding off on attacks to buy quiet don’t work with jihadist enemies like Hamas and Hizbullah.
These lessons – especially a focus on preemptive action – are now being applied in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza, where Hamas has been using the six-week ceasefire to prepare new attacks against Israel.
Hamas’ Pre-October 7 Planning
Multiple Israeli investigations into October 7 revealed that Hamas’s assault was the result of years of planning and preparation.
In a report released on March 13, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center focused on Hamas’ directive of seeking the complete destruction of Israel, contained in its charter and reinforced through Islamic religious and historical narratives. Hamas leaders portray Israel as an aberration, drawing a parallel to the medieval Crusader states that were eventually destroyed (this parallel was used earlier by Arab nationalist ideologists). For decades, this goal was framed as a long-term vision, but after the May 2021 conflict with Israel, Hamas began shifting toward a more immediate and practical approach to achieving Israel’s destruction.
Hamas documents seized by the IDF in Gaza reveal that following the May 2021 conflict, Hamas leaders, led by Yahya al-Sinwar, began discussing the goal as an executable plan rather than a long-term aspiration.
Captured internal communications show that Hamas did not act alone in this effort but coordinated with Iran and Hizbullah to prepare options for a multi-front assault. Hamas, Hizbullah, and Iran synchronized their strategies – or at least Hamas thought they did – to maximize the damage to Israel.
Iranian support helped Hamas with funding, weapons smuggling, advanced combat training, and the development of tunnel warfare capabilities. Letters exchanged between Hamas leadership and Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani confirm that Iran committed substantial financial and logistical support to Hamas’s military buildup, with Hamas specifically requesting $500 million over two years to accelerate its war preparations.
Hizbullah’s support for Hamas extended beyond joint training and planning – documents show that Hamas actively sought to establish a force in Lebanon, using Hizbullah infrastructure, as a staging ground for future operations against Israel.
Most revealing is a Hamas 2022 document outlining three strategic scenarios for a war aimed at Israel’s destruction, which were presented to Hizbullah and Iran for approval.
According to the Meir Amit Center, Yahya Sinwar, head of Hamas in Gaza sent a letter to Hamas politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh on June 19, 2022. “Since the ceasefire in [May 2021], our jihad fighters have been preparing at maximum speed and without hindrance. They are confident that their level of preparedness for a great strategic battle that will change the face of the region and its rules of engagement is almost complete, and that what they have prepared is sufficient to begin immediately if required by Allah’s command.”
Sinwar then presented three scenarios, beginning with the maximal first scenario, in which “all elements of the resistance axis,” except Iran, would attack Israel to lead to its collapse and cessation of existence.
“Such a campaign would change the face of the region, its world order and its political reality entirely, while also bringing about the realization of the great Islamic revolution,” wrote Sinwar. He estimated that the goal could be achieved “assuming Hizbullah possesses one-third of the capabilities they are claimed to have and participates in the battle with full force,” alongside “reasonable participation from Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, not the states themselves, but the axis forces…”
In a second, intermediate scenario, Hamas would play the central role against Israel, while Hizbullah would participate partially, with forces on other fronts, the West Bank, and the interior [of Israel] joining in. In Sinwar’s assessment, Israel would suffer significant damage, many of its citizens would seek to emigrate, and the liberation of Judea and Samaria and the release of prisoners would be achieved, laying the groundwork for Israel’s final destruction in the future.
In a third scenario, Hizbullah would not be a direct participant, at least not initially. The main burden would fall on Hamas, with additional forces from the ‘resistance axis’ and fedayeen from Jordan and Syria. It was the minimum scenario Hamas would settle for, and according to Sinwar, it did not require the approval of Iran’s Supreme Leader, only that of Hizbullah leader Nasrallah.
According to the Meir Amit Center report, on July 1, 2022, Haniyeh updated Sinwar “on the content of a secret meeting arranged by Haj Ramadan (Saeed Izadi, the head of the Palestine branch of the Qods Force) with Nasrallah, in which Hamas representatives presented the scenarios for the battle against Israel. According to Haniyeh, Nasrallah expressed support for the first scenario, the maximal campaign, calling it ‘realistic,’ and it was agreed that the issue would be presented to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei.”
Israeli Assumptions Pre-October 7
In Israel, intelligence assessments leading up to October 7 had detected Hamas’s military drills, tunnel expansions, fragments of its attack plans, and arms smuggling operations. However, these were misinterpreted as routine Hamas activity rather than preparations for war. There was no central hub where the data flowed into one large alarming picture.
The prevailing belief pre-October 7 within Israel’s security establishment was that Hamas would avoid large-scale confrontation, opting instead for limited escalations to extract economic and political concessions. Hamas was seen as deterred, aware of its military inferiority, and limited in its goals to solidifying its rule in Gaza.
These assumptions led to catastrophic failures in defensive military measures. Small numbers of military forces guarded the border with Gaza. The security barrier in southern Israel was breached at multiple points on October 7, and electronic surveillance systems sent warnings that no one could respond to, after the IDF’s Gaza Division was overwhelmed, including an attack on its headquarters in Re’im.
Internal Israeli investigations identified a fundamental flaw in Israel’s reliance on technological superiority without an equal investment in human intelligence and real-time battlefield awareness. Despite advanced monitoring capabilities, decisions were delayed, and key indicators of an imminent attack were overlooked. The lack of immediate and decisive action in response to these warning signs contributed to the scale of the disaster.
IDF Responses Post-October 7
The assessments have led to significant changes in IDF doctrine, particularly regarding rapid response capabilities and preemptive action.
The Israeli air force is making major changes. [Note: In the IDF, helicopter squadrons are part of the air force whereas in the US military, helicopters are generally commanded by ground forces.] In past conflicts, Israeli air and ground forces often operated with limited coordination when it came to border defense. In response to the failures of October 7, a new air force command structure has been introduced, ensuring real-time coordination between air and ground units to counter future infiltration attempts.
A dedicated “Participation and Borders Air Group” has been established to ensure sustained aerial oversight along high-risk border zones. This air group now works directly with ground forces, increasing surveillance and accelerating response times to emerging threats.
Hamas’s extensive use of tunnels, fortified positions, and decentralized command structures necessitated changes in Israel’s combat strategies. Special forces units and frontline combat teams have undergone extensive training to counter underground networks and fortified enemy positions.
Israel’s renewed military campaign in Gaza reflects post- October 7 lessons. Instead of acceding to truces as it did following prior rounds of conflict, Israel is aware of its existential need to eliminate both Hamas military infrastructure and the political regime that enables it to grow across Gaza. Allowing Hamas to regroup, as had occurred in previous ceasefires, increases the risk of another large-scale assault similar to October 7.
The post-October 7 emphasis on preemptive action is shaping Israel’s approach across the region. In Syria, Israel has conducted a sustained series of airstrikes targeting weapons depots that belonged to the old Asad regime, to prevent them from falling into the hands of potentially radical Sunni Islamist forces.
In Lebanon, Israeli intelligence now treats Hizbullah’s build-up as real-time missions that require immediate action. The assumption that deterrence alone can prevent attacks has been abandoned in favor of operations to disrupt the build-up, before new capabilities can be used against Israel. The Israeli air force strikes when violations of the truce by Hizbullah are detected – which they are on an almost daily basis.
Projecting Western assumptions onto jihadist adversaries was one of the conceptual failures that led to October 7. The findings from Israel’s internal defense and security establishment are driving substantial changes in Israel’s military posture, with more likely to come.
