The Kurds and Israelis are natural geopolitical allies. Many Kurdish Jews in Israel feel deeply connected to their ethnic heritage and maintain cultural links; the Kurdistan regional government in northern Iraq also has made tentative efforts to maintain cultural ties. But translating these perceptions of mutual interests and shared cultural traditions into a political alliance has proven difficult.
According to a 2001 study by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, this bond is not just ancient but likely genetic. Jews have resided in Kurdistan for almost 3,000 years. They lived there in relative harmony with their neighbors, maintained Jewish schools and synagogues. Kurdish Jews primarily spoke Aramaic, but they also borrowed words from the Kurdish language. Their community produced a distinctive “mountain Judaism,” which included a famous woman religious scholar, Osnat Barzani, and a unique Kurdish Jewish festival, Seharane.
On the eve of Israel’s establishment in 1948, Kurdish Jews numbered between 20,000 and 30,000, mostly living in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. After 1948, nearly all emigrated to Israel, leaving behind a rich cultural legacy. From 1951 to 1952, Israel conducted “Operation Ezra and Nehemia,” airlifting Kurdish Jews and Iraqi Jews en masse to the nascent Jewish state. Only a few hundred Jewish families remain in Kurdistan today, while the vast majority of Kurdish Jews – now around 200,000 – live in Israel where they established some of the earliest moshavim (farming villages) in the country.
Today, the Kurdish Jewish community of Israel displays cultural links. Streets in Israel are given Kurdish names, popular Israeli singers of Kurdish descent sing in Kurdish, and Kurdish restaurants abound. Kurdish Jews gather in Israel for the Seharane festival and Kurdiyada, a three-day festival featuring traditional Kurdish food, music, dance, and the flag of Kurdistan. The community also operates the National Association of Jews from Kurdistan, Israel-Kurdistan Friendship Association, Kurdish cultural centers, and a Kurdish Studies Program at Tel Aviv University, which hosted a Kurdish solidarity delegation from Germany in 2024.
In Iraq, the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government adopted a 2015 minority rights law, recognizing Judaism as a protected religion and creating the first representative for Jewish affairs in the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs. This position was intended to represent Kurdish Jewry and promote their rights, as well as preserve Jewish heritage sites in Kurdistan. In 2016, the Jewish affairs representative organized the first Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony in the Kurdish capital of Erbil, attended by Kurdistan officials and Kurdish Jews. Reflecting on the event, Mariwan Naqshbandi, the head of Kurdistan’s Directorate for Religious Coexistence, spoke of the “duty to support the Jewish religion.”
Despite this expression of support, few remnants of Jewish life in Kurdistan remain. Erbil’s Museum of Education has a one-room exhibit on Daniel Kassab, a famous Kurdish Jewish artist, and the Kurd Heritage Museum in Sulaymaniyah has a “Jewish Collection” with some artifacts. Otherwise, the former Jews of Kurdistan can only be found in spirit at the scattered archeological sites where ancient synagogues, tombs of Biblical figures, Jewish neighborhoods, and cemeteries once stood. Even the position of Jewish affairs representative reportedly no longer exists.
Today, Kurdish-Jewish cultural exchanges mostly take place in the context of Kurdistan-Israel relations. A Jewish Coalition for Kurdistan emerged in 2017 to strengthen the relationship between Jews and Kurds worldwide, as well as the diplomatic relations between Israel and Kurdistan. Its board includes the director of Tel Aviv University’s Kurdish Studies Program, Dr. Ofra Bengio, and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar.
Sa’ar began his tenure as foreign minister by calling the Kurdish people a “natural ally” of Israel. In his first speech at the Israeli Foreign Ministry last year, Sa’ar explained that “in a region where we will always be a minority, natural alliances will be with other minorities.” He emphasized the geostrategic importance of allying with Iraqi Kurdistan, which borders Iran and Turkey – regional adversaries of Israel. Kurds are viewed as a bulwark against these shared threats. Sa’ar also identified the Kurdish minorities in Lebanon and Syria as potential allies.
Israeli-Kurdish political ties were forged in the founding years of the state of Israel. Kurds were identified as a strategic ally under Prime Minister David Ben Gurion’s “periphery doctrine,” whereby Israel sought alliances with non-Arab actors on the periphery of the Middle East (including Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia). Israel supported Iraqi Kurds in their conflict with Baghdad, trained and equipped Peshmerga Kurdish fighters, and even helped form the Kurdish intelligence agency, Parastin. In 2014, Israel reportedly delivered humanitarian aid to ISIS victims in northern Iraq, and some Israeli oil imports in 2015 were traced back to Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Kurdistan-Israel alliance reached its apex in September 2017, ahead of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s referendum on independence from the Republic of Iraq, when Israel became the only country in the region to officially endorse Kurdish statehood. Jewish Kurds in Israel rallied in support of the referendum, waving the Kurdish flag on the streets of Jerusalem and hoping that an independent Kurdistan would formalize ties with Israel. Meanwhile, the Israeli flag could be seen at independence rallies in Erbil and other cities in Kurdistan. Following the referendum, the Israeli-Kurdish lobby in the Knesset hosted an event titled “Kurdistan and Israel: Together Toward Peace and Stability in the Middle East.” Subsequent legislative initiatives in the Israeli parliament sought to facilitate travel between Tel Aviv and Erbil and to recognize the Yezidi Kurdish genocide. There have also been efforts to recognize the 1988 Halabja massacre and Anfal campaign – the “Kurdish holocaust” perpetrated by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein – as a genocide.
Despite these longstanding cultural ties and tentative political outreach, Kurdish-Israeli rapprochement has been blocked by the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. In 2022, Baghdad made it a crime for Iraqi citizens, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (where Kurds hold Iraqi passports), to engage with Israel. Violations of the law are punishable by life imprisonment or even death, tightly constraining the Kurdish-Israeli connection. Meanwhile, Tehran has weaponized this relationship to delegitimize aspirations for Kurdish independence. Iran has portrayed initiatives like the “Abraham Peace Corridor” – a vision for regional integration that would enhance cooperation with Kurdistan – as a Zionist scheme for colonial expansion. In 2024, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fired ballistic missiles into Erbil, killing civilians while claiming – falsely, according to Baghdad and Erbil – that it had targeted an Israeli “spy headquarters.”
In neighboring Turkey, the notion of a Kurdish-Israeli partnership remains politically explosive. Turkish nationalists and Islamists have described Kurdistan as a “Second Israel,” meaning another conspiracy of Western-backed partition. In September 2017, tensions flared in Ankara as the Israeli embassy was evacuated amid protests by supporters of the ultra-nationalist Homeland Party who sought to portray the Kurdish independence referendum as a Zionist plot. Utku Reyhan, secretary-general of the Homeland Party, denounced the referendum as “a declaration of war by US imperialism and Israeli Zionism against the region,” framing Kurdish self-determination as a direct extension of Israeli regional ambitions. Ankara has peddled this same conspiracy by referring to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is presently disarming after decades of Turkey-PKK conflict, as a “subcontractor” of Israel.
Israeli-Kurdish ties have also resurfaced in Syria’s post-Asad transition. Questions of minority inclusion – particularly Kurdish participation – have once again become entangled with fears of Israeli influence. Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, told Israeli media that “the crisis of the Middle East requires everyone to understand that without Israel and Jewish people playing a role, a democratic solution for the region will not happen.” While President Al-Sharaa pledged to form an “inclusive transitional government reflecting Syria’s diversity,” his administration has been criticized for sidelining Kurdish and other minority groups. The Israeli government has responded by advocating for international support of Syrian Kurds – highlighting their crucial role in the fight against ISIS, providing Syrian Kurds with “positive guarantees,” and calling on the new Syrian leadership to uphold Kurdish rights.
The Gaza war has further tested this relationship, forcing Kurdish leaders to strike a careful balance between condemnation and compromise. Since October 2023, Kurdish leaders have condemned Palestinian suffering in Gaza while supporting a ceasefire and a negotiated compromise. At the outset of the war, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani cautioned against being “drawn into regional conflicts,” and reaffirmed that “our belief is that a two-state solution is the most appropriate resolution.” As the war dragged on, this balancing act continued, underscoring Erbil’s preference for pragmatic diplomacy and staying above the political fray.
In May 2025, Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met with the Palestinian Consul General in Erbil and called for a “just and lasting solution.” Last month, the Kurdistan Region Presidency endorsed the initiative to recognize Palestinian statehood at the United Nations. Kurdish leaders have also cautiously engaged with outside initiatives framed as diplomatic off-ramps. On September 30, 2025, President Barzani welcomed the US plan to end the Gaza war, urging all parties to demonstrate “the spirit of compromise.” Meanwhile, Kurdish society remains divided between Islamic parties who staunchly oppose Israel’s military campaign and those, mostly in the liberal urban communities of Kurdistan, who adopt a more neutral stance.
What the early leaders of the State of Israel and the Kurdish clans of northern Iraq recognized 75 years ago remains true today: Kurds and Israelis are natural allies. Furthermore, both share deep fundamental ties with the United States. It is also true, however, that steps to publicize and actualize a Kurdish-Israeli alliance endangers the Kurds, because it is perceived as threatening to Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. Thus, while intelligence ties continue, a full alliance between these two peoples must await further steps towards a new regional order that the US brings about with its regional allies.
In the meantime, gestures of goodwill from both sides are welcome – the Kurdistan Region should restore the position of Jewish affairs representative, Israel should reintroduce legislation recognizing the Yezidi Kurdish genocide – and can keep alive in both publics the prospect of a future alliance.
