Russia seized Crimea in 2014 and has held it since. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was supposed to consolidate that position. Instead, it transformed Crimea from a strategic asset into a liability — contested, costly, and increasingly difficult to defend.
Before 2022, Kyiv sought to reclaim Crimea through diplomatic means. There was no military option, and no one seriously suggested otherwise. Western sanctions were the main tool for pressure, and the international non-recognition framework remained intact. Russia’s full-scale invasion changed that. From the first hours of the war, Crimea served as a military launch pad — Russian troops pushed toward Kherson from the peninsula, missiles and drones hit mainland Ukraine from Crimean airbases, and warships fired on Ukrainian cities from the Black Sea. Russia had turned Crimea into its primary military rear. Ukraine responded by doing what the situation demanded – striking the military infrastructure Russia had spent years building on the peninsula. Ukrainian strikes have been relentless — at least 600 since February 2022 — and troops have physically set foot on Crimean soil: the most recent ground operation was a seaborne special forces landing on the Tarkhankut Peninsula in August 2023.
Russia’s 2022 offensive achieved a long-sought goal. By taking territory in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk, Moscow created an overland route to Crimea. This move reduced reliance on the Crimean Bridge, which is the only fixed connection between the peninsula and the Russian mainland, as the only supply link. But that corridor has been under persistent Ukrainian attack since it was established, with the narrow Perekop and Chonhar crossings repeatedly struck. The Crimean Bridge, opened by Putin in 2018 as Russia’s first direct land link to the peninsula, was rendered unusable for heavy military loads by spring 2024 following repeated Ukrainian strikes. The Black Sea Fleet, once the centerpiece of Russian power projection in the region, has lost over 30% of its vessels to Ukrainian strikes, including the flagship cruiser Moskva. Multiple S-300 and S-400 air defense batteries have been destroyed – losses worth billions of dollars that Russia’s defense industry, already stretched by a prolonged land war, cannot quickly make good. Crimea’s waters and skies are no longer safe for Russian assets. Russia is more and more focused on defending the peninsula rather than projecting force from it.
The paradox is that when Ukraine had no military means to challenge Crimea, the West was more vocal about the need for its return. Sanctions were maintained, non-recognition was seen as non-negotiable, and the peninsula was a significant topic in diplomatic discussions. Now that Ukraine is actively attacking Russian military targets there, the diplomatic conversation has changed direction. Under the second administration of US President Donald J. Trump, Washington proposed formally recognizing Russian control over Crimea as part of a ceasefire deal. The administration also worked to remove mentions of Crimea and Ukrainian territorial integrity from UN documents. The non-recognition consensus that held for a decade is fraying — driven not by battlefield developments, but by a shift in American political priorities.
The ongoing peace talks, shaped by the Trump administration’s mediation, have focused on Donbas. Crimea receives little serious attention from military planners or diplomats. The risk in this oversight should be clear. Keeping Crimea’s status legally and politically contested requires ongoing effort. If left unaddressed for too long, these omissions could lead to an impression of acceptance.
The stakes extend beyond Ukraine. Trump argued that NATO would be stronger with Greenland under U.S. control. This reasoning is even more relevant in the Black Sea context. Russia’s hold on Crimea and its operations from Sevastopol leave NATO’s southern side vulnerable. This affects Turkey’s Montreux strategy, Romania’s coastal stance, and the overall balance in the eastern Mediterranean. Crimea is not just a bilateral issue for Ukraine; it involves all allies.
The Crimea Development Programme to 2036, created by Russian-installed administrators, effectively admits that the peninsula has not been fully integrated after eleven years. The fortifications being built across Crimea send a similar message: those in charge of the occupation lack confidence in its permanence.
Ukraine felt a shift was coming, but from a different angle. The strike on Saky airbase in August 2022 marked a turning point. This base was one of Russia’s main launch points for air operations against Ukraine. After the strike, Crimea ceased to be a distant target and became an active front. It proved that Ukrainian forces could penetrate deep into the peninsula despite Russian air defenses. This shattered the belief that Crimea was untouchable. Alongside successful ground offensives that autumn, which reclaimed significant areas of Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, it sparked a hope in Kyiv that Crimea could be next. In October 2022, Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, openly predicted that Ukrainian forces could enter Crimea by spring 2023. President Zelensky framed the war around Crimea, stating it began there and would end there. Ukraine developed a plan for deoccupation. Civil society groups began research into transitional governance, property restitution, and the revival of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultural life, which had been suppressed during the occupation. The amount and seriousness of this work showed they genuinely believed that reintegration was forthcoming.
But the 2023 counteroffensive did not reach Crimea. Ukrainian forces made some progress in Zaporizhzhia oblast but could not break through Russian defensive lines deeply enough. The planning for liberation is now on hold; it is too important to discard but too soon to implement.
Liberation may not be imminent, but the erosion of Crimea’s fortress status is real. The question is whether that military reality is matched by a coordinated political effort. So far, it has not been.
Three things need to happen, and Western partners bear responsibility for all of them.
First, Crimea must be explicitly named in any US-brokered ceasefire or security framework. Vague language and convenient omissions function as concessions – they just do so quietly.
Second, the legal groundwork for EU accession needs to begin now. When Ukraine joins the EU, Crimea comes with it in legal terms. The single market, customs rules, sanctions, and cohesion frameworks all need provisions for a territory the Union cannot govern. Left unaddressed, accession will normalize the occupation by default.
Third, asymmetric military pressure must continue – and Western partners need to stop restricting the long-range weapons that make it effective. Strikes on Russian logistics, air defenses, and the land corridor are the most practical tool available for keeping Crimea contested. Limiting the weapons Ukraine needs to sustain that pressure does not preserve stability. It makes Russian retention cheaper.
