Twenty years of US neglect have created space for adversaries to build permanent footholds in the Western Hemisphere. Iran and other adversaries are quietly building an operational network in America’s backyard, one that sanctions alone cannot dismantle.
The Venezuela Nexus
Recent testimony from Hugo “Pollo” Carvajal, Venezuela’s former intelligence chief, reveals the depth of Iran-Venezuela cooperation. It’s not merely a symbolic partnership; operational collaboration spans military affairs, intelligence sharing, and sophisticated sanctions evasion schemes.
Carvajal testified that Venezuela’s regime created the Tren de Aragua gang, whose members now operate across the United States, engaging in kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, and political intimidation of Venezuelan exile communities.
Iran’s strategy leverages existing criminal networks across Latin America. Iranian proxy Hizbullah maintains extensive connections with drug cartels and gangs throughout the region. In Europe, Iran has already demonstrated willingness to use criminal organizations like Foxtrot and Rumba for assassinations, surveillance, and abductions. Latin America’s fragmented security environment provides an ideal operating space for similar activities.
This proxy approach offers Iran plausible deniability while expanding operational capabilities. Criminal networks provide intelligence gathering, logistics support, and potential strike capabilities without direct Iranian fingerprints—a model that could easily scale across the hemisphere.
Iran has also established a drone manufacturing facility in Venezuela, potentially giving Tehran the capability to launch attacks against the United States from South American soil, an assessment echoed by Israeli Defense Forces reports.
An Expanding Network of Adversaries
The Iran-Venezuela partnership anchors a broader “axis of evasion” across Latin America.
Bolivia, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has signed defense agreements with Iran that reportedly include providing Bolivian passports to Iranian citizens, a practice Venezuela pioneered and extended to Caribbean nations. Argentina’s homeland security ministry has expressed concern that such arrangements could facilitate terrorism throughout the region.
Colombia, a strong US ally for decades, has taken the lead in defying Washington in the region. Most recently, it organized a conference in Bogota that gathered representatives from several countries from the Global South in opposition to the war in Gaza. Colombia’s president, Gustavo Petro, also condemned NATO and threatened to withdraw his country’s alliance with the group. Petro is in contact with Iranian leaders and has expressed a desire to strengthen relations with Iran.
Brazil presents perhaps the most concerning case. President Lula da Silva’s government condemned Israeli operations against Iran and accused Israel of “premeditated genocide” in Gaza. In 2023, two Iranian warships docked in Rio de Janeiro, one “was suspected of being involved in a weapons sale to Venezuela that ultimately fell flat”, according to the former chairman of the U.S House Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael Mc Caul. Brazil-Iran trade has reached $3 billion annually, cementing economic ties that complement political alignment.
The pattern extends beyond Iran. Russia has established an ammunition factory in Venezuela, while China has announced plans to modernize Venezuela’s power grid and signed AI cooperation agreements. Iran is building Venezuela’s first fiber optic plant. These aren’t isolated transactions, they represent coordinated infrastructure development designed to create permanent adversarial presence.
Sanctions: A Double-Edged Sword
The US general response has been predictably narrow: sanctions. When Washington revoked Western oil companies’ licenses to operate in Venezuela two months ago, the move backfired. Rather than pressuring the Venezuelan regime, it accelerated Maduro’s pivot toward America’s adversaries.
The regime now employs sophisticated “ship-to-ship” operations, transferring Venezuelan crude to vessels flying Comorian flags before delivering oil to China via Malaysian and Singaporean ports. These dark fleet operations circumvent US sanctions and help create dangerous new smuggling networks. The same networks moving oil today could transport weapons tomorrow.
China purchases approximately 255,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude daily, according to S&P Global data. US sanctions have redirected an estimated $226 billion in oil revenue from Western markets to China, strengthening Beijing’s energy security and weakening Washington’s leverage on Venezuela.
Current US policy compounds these problems through threats of punitive tariffs. President Trump’s threat to impose 50 percent tariffs on Brazil, over Jair Bolsonaro’s legal troubles, exemplifies counterproductive thinking. Such measures would likely push Brazil further toward Russia, China, and Iran while undermining US credibility regarding rule of law and sovereignty.
Polls indicated that Brazil’s president, Luis Inácio “Lula” Da Silva, was recently losing popularity. However, Trump’s threat to impose tariffs triggered a nationalistic reaction that boosted the anti-American Brazilian president’s popularity in the polls. Similarly, in . recent elections in Canada, Trump’s threats of tariffs helped lifted the Liberal Party’s popularity.
In Venezuela, sanctions that primarily harm civilians while leaving the regime’s drug trafficking and illicit revenue streams intact serve neither humanitarian nor strategic objectives. Maduro’s government has proven remarkably adaptable to economic pressure while maintaining political control through repression and criminal enterprise.
A Path Forward: “Plan Colombia” Level of Engagement
Effective policy requires moving beyond sanctions and tariffs toward comprehensive regional engagement. “Plan Colombia,” the American assistance package created in 1999, demonstrates what success looks like: sustained partnership combining security cooperation, economic development, and institution building. That model addressed root causes of instability while strengthening democratic governance.
The United States must rebuild diplomatic presence and economic partnerships across Latin America before adversaries consolidate their gains.This means serious investment in regional relationships, not just crisis management. Demanding security cooperation from Brazil while threatening economic warfare over domestic legal proceedings is counterproductive.
The Stakes
Iran’s expanding presence in Latin America is a direct threat to American homeland security. The same networks facilitating sanctions evasion today could support terrorist operations tomorrow.
The Trump administration faces a stark choice: continue reactive, sanctions-focused policies or develop comprehensive regional strategies that address security challenges through sustained partnership and engagement. Latin America’s problems won’t solve themselves, and America’s adversaries won’t abandon such strategically valuable territory voluntarily.
The cost of continued neglect may be measured in American lives, not just diplomatic influence. It’s time for Washington to take Latin America seriously.
Luis Fleischman is a professor of sociology at Palm Beach State College and the founding co-chair of the Palm Beach Center for Democracy, a recently created think-tank based in Florida.
