After two years of brutal war, almost daily announcements of the names of the fallen, regular missile attacks from Yemen or Iran driving people to take shelter, and constant concern for the fate of the hostages in Gaza, Israelis could have been expected to celebrate a bit. All the hostages, with the exception of one body, have been returned, alarms no longer wake up terrified children in the middle of the night, and almost no new lives are lost (although airstrikes in Gaza and Lebanon, and special forces raids into Syria, still take place regularly).
Even the sense of siege in the international arena has eased somewhat. The most prominent political figure in Europe, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, visited Israel, as his country celebrated the deployment of the Arrow 3 Israeli-made missile defense systems. Bolivia, following a change of government, reestablished full diplomatic relations. The bid to remove Israel from the Eurovision Song Contest failed, although four countries are boycotting the event. Israel has moved to enhance strategic relations with Greece, and there is talk of a summit between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Sisi of Egypt under President Trump’s aegis.
And yet, the national mood is subdued and pensive. Israelis are now focused inward. This is already an election year; the current term of the Knesset ends in October 2026, and some expect the government to fall earlier (over the annual budget possibly) with elections in the spring.
The Domestic Agenda
A trifecta of agonizing domestic issues now dominates the national agenda.
The Draft. The specific issue is how many ultra-Orthodox young men (ultra-Orthodox women are certainly exempt) would be recruited by the IDF in the coming years, and what would be the criteria for exemption? What might have been a highly professional discussion has in fact turned into a fierce political debate.
Netanyahu is trying to cut a deal, but the opposition reflects the outraged opinion of most Israelis. Even the modern Orthodox (in Israel called “nationalist religious”) leaders who sit in the governing coalition can no longer accept that their communities should suffer such losses and the prolonged absences of their breadwinners, while another segment of society does nothing. If the issue remains salient at the time of the vote, it will harm the prospects of Netanyahu’s party, the Likud.
Accountability for October 7. Polls show that most Israelis want a commission of inquiry into the disastrous events of 7 October 2023, headed (as the law requires) by a Supreme Court judge and given a broad authority. Netanyahu and his supporters profoundly distrust the entire legal system (which they see as composed of their political rivals) and may push through a law establishing an alternative model, with representation for both sides of the political divide.
One question to be addressed in a commission of inquiry is whether the failure of October 7 should be limited to the intelligence professionals or whether it should be broadened to include the political echelon, including the Prime Minister’s own policy of attempting to manage Hamas through economic incentives (including deliveries of Qatari money). The terms of reference of the commission will be bitterly debated.
A Presidential Pardon. The same tensions color the third issue: the ability of the President of Israel to preemptively pardon Prime MInister Netanyahu on charges of accepting favors and trying to tilt media coverage. Had the Prime Minister been willing to admit guilt and step down, the pardon would have been a no brainer. The ongoing trial has been a painful drag on the conduct of national affairs. But given Netanyahu’s reluctance, the pardon may come to be perceived as a retroactive indictment of those in the legal system who insisted on the trial in the first place.
The External Agenda
Meanwhile, no real progress is evident on Israel’s external agenda. In the run-up to the next meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, four crucial decisions are on the agenda.
Postwar Gaza. Once the remains of the last hostage have been retrieved, “phase two” in Gaza, as stipulated in the Trump 20-point plan and governed now by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, is supposed to go into effect.
Israel is comfortable with many aspects of the plan: it calls for Hamas to demilitarize and for its terror infrastructure to be dismantled; it accepts the idea that Israel will retain a perimeter in the Gaza Strip until that far-off day in which it will no longer be dangerous to leave it; and it conditions discussions of a path to Palestinian statehood (a concept which most Israelis worry about at this stage), on two conditions: the decommissioning of arms in Gaza and profound Palestinian reforms.
Yet it is difficult to see the International Stabilization Force taking shape soon, let alone forcing Hamas to disarm. THat task may fall again to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Alternatively, we may see an effort to create “a new Gaza” in the area now remaining under IDF control: the point of decision between these two options (or the emergence of a middle way between them) cannot be far off, even if this may further shatter the Israeli governing coalition.
Lebanon. With Hizbullah now openly rejecting the calls upon it to disarm, Israel faces a dilemma: the Lebanese authorities are increasingly vocal in demanding it, but much less effective in enforcing it, even south of the Litani river, where the process is scheduled to begin. Both the US and Israel say their patience is not unlimited and a decision to escalate further may be around the corner. Yet Israel, responding to American suggestions, did take a step towards more open dialogue with the Lebanese government, sending an National Security Council official to meet openly with a Lebanese counterpart in the border town of Nakoura. Yet that promising diplomatic step has yet to bear fruit.
Syria. Israel has engaged the new regime at a ministerial level but no agreement has yet been reached, and there are growing signs of disagreement between the American and Israeli positions. The text of the President’s National Security Strategy Document, speaks in terms of an “integral” (centralized) Syria. Israel remains focused on minority rights in Syria, especially the autonomous interests of the Druze and Kurds, and the need for a regime with a jihadist pedigree to deliver on security measures. Given the political climate in Israel it is difficult to foresee a willingness to offer significant concessions, let alone withdraw from the key position at the top of the Hermon Mountain, while Syrian affairs seem far from settled and the influence of radical elements is apparently growing.
Iran. Israel still faces a vengeful Iran and a fork in the road lies ahead: With the Iranian Rial in free fall, at more than a million to the dollar, and Tehran increasingly becoming unlivable, Netanyahu is pushing for regime change policy options. However, if those who seek to return to the negotiating table do gain the upper hand in Iran, Israel would be forced to respond to Trump’s push for a peaceful resolution. If (as seems more likely) Khamene’i once again chooses a provocative path, the events of June 2025 may prove to be just the first round in a war that has not ended.
A lull now, turbulence ahead: the decisions which have yet to be taken are all the more difficult for a Prime Minister suspected by many of prolonging external conflicts for his own personal gain. This combination of domestic challenges and difficult external decisions highlights the overriding importance of overt international, or at least American, legitimation for any military action Israel may feel it is obliged to take.
