There is no telling when and how the current war pitting the United States and Israel against Iran will end. Whether it ends with a negotiated settlement, a devastating use of military force, or something in between, both Washington and Jerusalem will have reasons to pay close attention to Iran for years after. As they do so, it will be important for them not to be too ambitious in their goals, to be realistic about what they can achieve in Iran as they tackle threats elsewhere simultaneously.
Regarding the matter of who governs Iran, there are two overarching possible outcomes. In one case, the Islamist regime in Tehran survives, but is considerably weaker militarily than it was when the war started on February 28. In the other, the regime falls from power, and Iran endures internal political disorder, possibly including a civil war. In either case, the U.S. and Israel must be cautious, and must not aim too high in their objectives.
If the Regime Remains
If a weakened Islamist regime clings to power in Tehran, however frustrating their survival will be for the U.S. and Israel, the allies should not seek regime change. The predominant focus of further uses of combined military force should be eliminating Iran’s most dangerous tools: its nuclear weapons program and its long-range missiles. There are two main reasons for primarily targeting these most powerful of Iran’s threats to Middle Eastern security, rather than attempting to completely militarily cripple the Islamic Republic.
First, Iran’s increasing use of drones makes it extremely difficult for Washington and Jerusalem to truly extinguish the entire military threat Iran poses. Iran has struck Israel, Arab nations, and U.S. military facilities in the Middle East with unmanned aircraft that are far cheaper and quicker to produce than many conventional aircraft and missiles. Shooting these drones down is an expensive process for the U.S., a fact that is especially troubling given that the American military was already struggling with munitions shortages before the start of the Iran war.
Second, both Israel and the U.S. face numerous security challenges apart from Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon. That is part of the nature of 21st century geopolitics – threats are always emerging and evolving, and a democracy that wants to protect itself must be vigilant. While a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable, it is only one of several threats President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and their successors must pay attention to.
In Israel’s case, the continued existence of Hamas in Gaza as an armed force allows for the possibility of another attack on the scale of October 7, 2023. There is also the danger of a Hamas resurgence in the West Bank should Israel give in to international pressure and unilaterally begin withdrawing. Furthermore, despite being battered by Israel, Hezbollah persists as a powerful force in Lebanon, determined to keep up its fight against the Jewish state while keeping its fellow Lebanese in its grip. In Syria, while President Ahmed al-Sharaa has sought to avoid conflict with Israel, there is always the possibility that he will be overthrown by Islamist hardliners who are open to cooperating with Israel’s enemies.
In America’s case, the ever-present threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan looms over the Western Pacific, demanding the constant attention of the U.S. and its allies in the region. Even if China does not attack Taiwan in 2027 (the year by which Xi Jinping has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to bring the democratic island under Beijing’s thumb), the possibility of such an attack in 2028 or beyond can never be ruled out. Meanwhile, although the brave resistance of Ukrainians, aided by the U.S. and Europe, has stymied Vladimir Putin’s attempts to resurrect the Soviet Union for the last four years, Russia’s dictator can always experiment with other ways to weaken NATO and drive wedges between America and Europe. Whoever sits in the Oval Office, the U.S. will have a strategic and moral interest in preventing a transatlantic split.
This does not mean weapons other than nuclear warheads and missiles should be completely exempt from U.S.-Israeli efforts to contain Iran. Locating and destroying Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz, for example, is a task to which the U.S. Navy can and should devote resources. And if U.S. and Israeli defensive weapons prove inadequate to defend against future waves of Iranian drones, striking the bases from which those drones are launched may be justified. In general, however, devoting the bulk of time, attention, and resources aimed at Iran to destroying its nuclear facilities and missiles is the best use of U.S. and Israeli military power at a time of multiple threats.
If the Regime Falls
The civil wars that Iraq and Syria have suffered in the first quarter of the 21st century have been bloody and complex. Ethnic and religious groups fought each other bitterly, outside actors backed favored factions, and for several years the Islamic State kept large swaths of both countries under its brutal control. While Iraq is now more stable than at any point since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and while the ruthless dictatorship of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad collapsed in 2024, both countries’ experiences in the recent past are reasons for anyone thinking about Iran’s future to be cautious.
In both population and geographic terms, Iran is larger than Iraq and Syria combined. If a civil war were to befall Iran, one shudders to think of the scale of the human suffering that would result. As well as the U.S. and Israel, many countries with a stake in the outcome of such a conflict would see reasons to insert themselves in one way or another: China, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and more. The interventions of these countries need not take the form of direct military action in order to do serious damage. The side of an Iranian civil war that triumphed could be the side that received the most weapons, money, intelligence assistance, and support in international fora from outside powers. It would be a humanitarian nightmare, one probably beyond America and Israel’s ability to stop.
It would be a mistake for the U.S. or Israel to overtly favor one portion of the anti-Islamist Iranian forces over all others. Reza Pahlavi, for example, enjoys support both in Iran and among the Iranian diaspora, but that support is far from universal. If he receives a place of power and influence in a post-Islamist Iran, it should be the result of a democratic process, and should not simply happen because his father was the country’s last pre-Islamist ruler. Outsiders should not do anything to give Iranians the impression that they are trying to force a new monarch down their throats. Whether the future Iran is a secular republic, a constitutional monarchy, or anything else is for Iranians to decide.
The story of Ahmed Chalabi provides a cautionary tale. The leader of the Iraqi National Congress, an influential group of Iraqi exiles committed to overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime, Chalabi hoped to play a major role in governing a post-Saddam Iraq. He had many friends among Americans who shared his goal of regime change in Baghdad. However, by the time Saddam was overthrown, Chalabi had been away from his homeland for 45 years (although he had conducted anti-regime operations during the 1990s from the Kurdish region of Iraq that was not under Saddam’s control). He never developed a strong base of support among Iraqis who had endured Saddam’s brutality for decades, and thus ended up with little influence on the process of establishing an Iraqi democracy. While Iranians may be more sympathetic to Pahlavi than Iraqis were to Chalabi, the fact that he has lived outside Iran for 47 years is a reason not to rush him into power should the Islamists fall.
Conclusion
However the war ends, and however strong Iran’s theocratic rulers emerge at the end, it would be wise for America and Israel to limit their future ambitions in Iran. As wonderful as it would be for the tyrants of Tehran to be overthrown, Washington and Jerusalem should not devote time, energy, and resources to that goal, given the multitude of security challenges each faces. Limiting future military action to keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and denying it the missiles on which it can place nuclear warheads, is a realistic objective for the two countries. Aiming too high risks overstretch and further conflict.
